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 contentsrescind the hospital’s Catholic status, he asked 
the hospital and Catholic Healthcare West, 
the system to which St. Joseph’s belongs, to 
provide an independent moral analysis of the 
situation. Lysaught, a Marquette University 
professor who specializes in moral theology 
and bioethics, provided the analysis; Bishop 
Olmsted rejected her conclusions. “In spite of 
the best efforts of the mother and of her medi-
cal staff, the fetus had become terminal, not 
because of a pathology of its own but because 
of a pathology in its maternal environment,” 
Lysaught wrote. She added, “There was no 
longer any chance that the life of this child 
could be saved.” Lysaught looked at the clinical 
history of the case, provided theoretical back-
ground for her conclusions and comment-
ed on statements by the National Catholic 
Bioethics Center and the U.S. Conference of 
Catholic Bishops’ Committee on Doctrine. The 
moral analysis follows.
Clinical History and Events
a 27-year-old woman with a his-tory of moderate but well-con-trolled pulmonary hyperten-sion was seen on Oct. 12, 2009, 
at her pulmonologist’s ofﬁce for worsening 
symptoms of her disease. The results of a rou-
tine pregnancy test revealed that in spite of 
her great efforts to avoid it, she had conceived 
and was then 7 1/2 weeks pregnant.
The pulmonologist counseled her that 
her safest course of action was to end the 
pregnancy, since in the best case, pregnan-
cy with pulmonary hypertension carries a 
10-15 percent risk of mortality for a pregnant 
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“It was not a case of saving the 
mother ‘or’ the child. It was not a 
matter of choosing one life ‘or’ the 
other.”
Moral Analysis 
of Procedure at 
Phoenix Hospital
M. Therese Lysaught
A Catholic hospital in Phoenix “acted in accord 
with the Ethical and Religious Directives, 
Catholic moral tradition and universally valid 
moral precepts” in carrying out a controver-
sial procedure on an ill pregnant woman 
that resulted in the death of the unborn 
child, theologian M. Therese Lysaught said 
in a moral analysis of the situation. Phoenix 
Bishop Thomas J. Olmsted determined that 
the November 2009 procedure constituted a 
direct abortion, and he subsequently stripped 
St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center of its 
Catholic status. (See Origins, Vol. 40, No. 31, 
for more documentation on the case.) In dis-
cussions leading up to the bishop’s decision to 
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Father John Ehrich, the 
medical ethics director for 
the Diocese of Phoenix, wrote 
the following statement in 
May 2010:
“A recent news story has 
brought to our attention 
the potential dangers that 
still exist during pregnancy 
for both mother and child. 
We naturally ask, what is 
the right thing to do if a 
pregnant woman’s life is in 
danger? Is it ever legitimate 
to perform an abortion to 
save the mother’s life? As 
Catholics, we have clear 
teaching in this area that 
helps us to act in accord with 
God’s will and in recognition 
of the human dignity of every 
person.
“Some Basic Principles
“It is important to note at 
the outset that these are 
very complex issues which 
demand careful reﬂection. We 
ﬁrst need to start with some 
basic moral principles.
“First, no one can do evil that 
good may come. We com-
monly know this as ‘the end 
does not justify the means.’ 
Just because we can do some-
thing does not mean that we 
should.
“Second, when speaking of a 
woman who is pregnant, we 
are always referring to two 
people: mother and child. 
Therefore, any medical inter-
vention must seek the good 
of both mother and child. In 
short, we are dealing with 
two patients, not just one. 
So, we never would speak of 
how the mother’s life is at 
risk without reference to her 
unborn child. Her child has 
as much dignity and value 
as she does. Morally speaking 
we can never prefer one life 
over the other.
“Third, the unborn child 
can never be thought of as 
a pathology or an illness. 
That is, the child is not that 
which threatens the life of 
the mother, rather it is the 
pathology or illness (can-
cer, premature rupture of 
membranes, hypertension, 
pre-eclampsia, etc.) which 
threatens the mother’s life. 
While it is often possible that 
woman trying to carry to term, and because of 
the severity of her disease, her own prospects 
were closer to 50-50. Importantly, the woman, 
a Catholic with four children, decided not to 
terminate.
On Nov. 3, 2009, the woman was admit-
ted to St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center 
with worsening symptoms. At this time, the 
woman was 11 weeks pregnant. A cardiac cath-
eterization revealed that the woman now had 
“very severe pulmonary arterial hypertension 
with profoundly reduced cardiac output”; in 
another part of the record, a different physi-
cian conﬁrmed “severe, life-threatening pul-
monary hypertension,” “right heart failure” 
and “cardiogenic shock.” The chart noted that 
she had been informed that her risk of mor-
tality “approaches 100 percent,” is “near 100 
percent” and is “close to 100 percent” if she 
were to continue the pregnancy. The chart also 
noted that “surgery is absolutely contraindi-
cated.”
“The chart noted that she had been 
informed that her risk of mortality 
‘approaches 100 percent,’ is ‘near 
100 percent’ and is ‘close to 100 
percent’ if she were to continue the 
pregnancy. The chart also noted 
that ‘surgery is absolutely contra-
indicated.’”
Pulmonary hypertension is a type of high 
blood pressure that affects only the arteries 
in the lungs and the right side of the heart. It 
begins when the arteries and capillaries in the 
lung become narrowed, blocked or destroyed, 
making it harder for blood to ﬂow through the 
lungs, raising the pressure in those arteries.
One consequence of this restricted ﬂow is 
that the heart’s lower right chamber (the right 
ventricle) has to work harder to pump blood 
into the lungs, which eventually causes the 
heart muscle to weaken and fail. Pulmonary 
hypertension is a serious illness that becomes 
progressively worse; it is not curable but it can 
be treated, easing the symptoms; it is some-
times fatal.1
The normal physiologic changes accompa-
nying pregnancy — increased blood volume 
(40 percent), increased cardiac output (30-50 
percent by 25 weeks) and slightly decreased 
systemic blood pressure (10-20 percent by 28 
weeks) — exacerbate pulmonary hyperten-
sion, leading to the increased risk of mortality 
for the mother.2
In the current case, the patient’s attempt 
to continue the pregnancy in order to nurture 
the child’s life led to two negative physiological 
outcomes: the failure of the right side of the 
patient’s heart and cardiogenic shock.
Failure of the right side of the patient’s heart 
means that the heart can no longer pump 
blood into the lungs so that the blood can be 
oxygenated. Without oxygenated blood, the 
body’s organs and tissues quickly begin to die. 
Cardiogenic shock is “a state in which the heart 
has been damaged so much that it is unable 
to supply enough blood to the organs of the 
body.”3
In cardiogenic shock, cardiac output 
decreases and one begins to see evidence of 
tissue hypoxia — lack of oxygenation of the 
patient’s tissues and major organs. Clinical 
criteria for cardiogenic shock are “sustained 
hypotension (systolic blood pressure <90 mm 
Hg for at least 30 min) and a reduced cardiac 
index (<2.2 L/min/m2) in the presence of ele-
vated pulmonary capillary occlusion pressure 
(>15 mm Hg).” In addition, visible signs of car-
diogenic shock can be observed at the bedside, 
including “hypotension and clinical signs of 
poor tissue oxygenation, which include oligu-
ria [low urine output], cyanosis [blue color-
ation of the skin], cool extremities and altered 
mentation.”4
There is no cure for pulmonary hyperten-
sion. In this case, however, two additional 
pathologies emerged — the pathology of right 
side heart failure and cardiogenic shock. These 
pathologies were immediately caused by the 
physiologic changes accompanying pregnan-
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the pregnancy will aggra-
vate an existing condition, 
we should never accuse the 
child of being a threat to the 
mother.
“In difﬁcult situations when 
the mother’s life is threatened 
by an underlying condition, 
the solution can never be 
to directly kill her unborn 
child. To do so is an abortion. 
A dilation and curettage or 
dilation and extraction pro-
cedure in this context is the 
same thing as an abortion 
since it is the direct killing of 
an unborn child. The reason 
for such a procedure never 
matters. It is also important 
to note that the secondary 
intention or goal does not 
change the moral evil of this 
act. As John Paul II taught 
infallibly in his encyclical 
‘The Gospel of Life’:
“‘I declare that direct abor-
tion, that is, abortion willed 
as an end or as a means, 
always constitutes a grave 
moral disorder, since it is 
the deliberate killing of an 
innocent human being. 
This doctrine is based upon 
the natural law and upon 
the written word of God, is 
transmitted by the church’s 
tradition, and taught by the 
ordinary and universal mag-
isterium’ (No. 62).
“What Can Be Done?
“So what can be done in such 
a situation? That depends 
upon the actual pathology or 
illness. The pathology should 
always be treated, to the 
extent possible, all the while 
remembering that there are 
two patients who are at risk. 
When treating the illness, 
physicians should always try 
to protect the life of the child, 
who has just as much a right 
to life as the mother.
“In the best of circumstances 
a physician will treat the 
mother’s pathology and 
hold off on more aggressive 
treatment until the child is 
past the point of viability, 
at which time labor can be 
induced. Sometimes, how-
ever, the actual pathology 
must be treated prior to the 
viability of the child and may 
indirectly cause the death of 
the child.
cy that exacerbated the underlying pathol-
ogy of pulmonary hypertension. The physi-
ologic changes accompanying pregnancy at 10 
weeks initiated the emergency situation. These 
changes not only put the mother’s life at risk. 
Rather, they put the mother’s life in peril.
Moreover, the life of the fetus was equally in 
peril due to the pathologies of right heart fail-
ure and cardiogenic shock. Oxygen delivered to 
the placenta and fetus is dependent on mater-
nal arterial oxygen content and uterine blood 
ﬂow. Decrease in maternal cardiac output and 
decrease in blood oxygenation can adversely 
affect fetal oxygenation; the uterus and pla-
centa number among the organs becoming 
hypoxic during this crisis. Further, maternal 
hypotension may constrict the uterine artery, 
decreasing blood ﬂow to the fetus.5
Therefore, on Nov. 5, 2009, mother and 
fetus were both in the process of dying. Due 
to the age of the fetus, there was no possibility 
that it could survive outside the womb. Nor, 
due to the mother’s heart failure and cardio-
genic shock, was there any possibility that the 
fetus could survive inside the womb. In short, 
in spite of the best efforts of the mother and of 
her medical staff, the fetus had become termi-
nal, not because of a pathology of its own but 
because of a pathology in its maternal environ-
ment. There was no longer any chance that 
the life of this child could be saved. This is 
crucial to note insofar as it establishes that at 
the point of decision, it was not a case of saving 
the mother or the child. It was not a matter of 
choosing one life or the other. The child’s life, 
because of natural causes, was in the process 
of ending.
There was, however, a chance that the life of 
the mother could be saved. There was one pos-
sibility for treating and reversing the pathol-
ogy of the emergent conditions of right heart 
failure and cardiogenic shock. The interven-
tion for treating this pathology was to elimi-
nate the cause of the increased blood volume 
and increased demand for cardiac output. The 
cause of this increased blood ﬂow and cardiac 
demand was not the fetus but rather the pla-
centa — an organ in its own right. This requires 
clariﬁcation.
Until about nine weeks into a pregnancy, 
the ovaries are responsible for the production 
of progesterone, which maintains the preg-
nancy in the uterus and causes the increase in 
blood volume cited above. At about 10 weeks, 
the placenta is the organ that takes over this 
work, becoming a shared organ between the 
mother and the child. In this case, having 
reached week 11, the placenta was producing 
the physiological changes that imperiled the 
mother’s and child’s lives. No organ, however, 
exists in a vacuum. The human body is a com-
plex and carefully balanced network.
In this case, the normal functioning of an 
organ (the placenta) within a diseased net-
work (of pulmonary arteries) created a lethal 
situation. Importantly, although in one respect 
the placenta was functioning “normally,” it was 
also functioning pathologically in two ways. 
First, once the placenta initiated its normal 
function at week 10, a crisis was created. 
Second, once the patient entered cardiogenic 
shock, the placenta also became hypoxic. In 
these two ways, then, the placenta not only 
initiated a threat to the mother’s life; it also 
became the immediate/presenting cause of 
the inevitably fatal threat to the fetus.
“The child’s life, because of natu-
ral causes, was in the process of 
ending.”
These facts are important to establish 
because the claim has been made that the 
hospital sought primarily to end the life of the 
fetus as the means to saving the mother’s life. 
This, however, is physiologically inaccurate. It 
is likely that in this case as in many cases of 
natural fetal demise, the death of the fetus in 
se would have had no physiologic effect on the 
mother.
In many cases of fetal demise, the preg-
nancy itself continues; fetal death is often not 
detected for weeks or months, although the 
pregnancy itself continues to proceed and 
develop because the hormones required for 
sustaining and advancing the pregnancy come 
not from the fetus but from the placenta.
Based on these facts, the ethics committee 
at St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center was 
asked for a determination of whether or not 
the intervention to address the placental issue 
via a dilation and curettage would be morally 
appropriate according to Catholic teaching. 
Per their reading of the “Ethical and Religious 
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services” 
(4th edition) and their understanding of the 
Catholic moral tradition, the ethics committee 
determined that the intervention would not be 
considered a direct abortion. They therefore 
approved the intervention, which was carried 
out on Nov. 5, 2009.
Moral Analysis
The primary question in this case is whether 
the ethics committee at St. Joseph’s Hospital 
and Medical Center was correct in their deter-
mination that the intervention did not consti-
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tute a direct abortion and was therefore justiﬁ-
able according to the Catholic moral tradition. 
“Direct” is a technical term in the Catholic 
moral tradition, as is “abortion.” Therefore, an 
extended presentation of the tradition in this 
regard is required to evaluate the committee’s 
decision.
Magisterial Teaching
Catholic Healthcare West strives to embody 
the fundamental commitment of the Catholic 
faith “to promote and defend human dignity 
... the foundation of [our tradition’s] concern 
to respect the sacredness of every human life 
from the moment of conception until death.”6
They understand this commitment to 
embody a preferential option for those who are 
the most vulnerable, including and especially 
those persons who are not yet born.7
Consequently, direct abortions are forbid-
den in all Catholic Healthcare West hospitals. 
Catholic Healthcare West bases this deci-
sion on magisterial teaching on abortion and 
intrinsically evil acts. Important magisterial 
documents here include: The “Declaration on 
Procured Abortion” (1974), Veritatis Splendor 
(1993) and Evangelium Vitae (1995). Key 
passages from these documents are provid-
ed below. As the “Declaration on Procured 
Abortion” states:
“Divine law and natural reason, therefore, 
exclude all right to the direct killing of an inno-
cent man. However, if the reasons given to 
justify an abortion were always manifestly evil 
and valueless the problem would not be so dra-
matic. The gravity of the problem comes from 
the fact that in certain cases, perhaps in quite a 
considerable number of cases, by denying abor-
tion one endangers important values to which it 
is normal to attach great value, and which may 
sometimes even seem to have priority. We do 
not deny these very great difﬁculties. It may be 
a serious question of health, sometimes of life 
or death, for the mother. ... We proclaim only 
that none of these reasons can ever objectively 
confer the right to dispose of another’s life.”8
Veritatis Splendor includes abortion among 
its long list of intrinsically evil acts, which it 
describes as follows:
“Reason attests that there are objects of the 
human act which are by their nature ‘inca-
pable of being ordered’ to God, because they 
radically contradict the good of the person 
made in his image. These are the acts which, in 
the church’s moral tradition, have been termed 
‘intrinsically evil’ (intrinsece malum): They are 
such always and per se, in other words, on 
account of their very object, and quite apart 
from the ulterior intentions of the one acting 
and the circumstances. Consequently, without 
in the least denying the inﬂuence on morality 
exercised by circumstances and especially by 
intentions, the church teaches that ‘there exist 
acts which per se and in themselves, indepen-
dently of circumstances, are always seriously 
wrong by reason of their object.’”9
These teachings were reiterated by John 
Paul II in Evangelium Vitae:
“Procured abortion is the deliberate and 
direct killing, by whatever means it is carried 
out, of a human being in the initial phase of his 
or her existence, extending from conception 
to birth. ... It is true that the decision to have 
an abortion is often tragic and painful for the 
mother, insofar as the decision to rid herself of 
the fruit of conception is not made for purely 
selﬁsh reasons or out of convenience, but out 
of a desire to protect certain important values 
such as her own health. ... I declare that direct 
abortion, that is, abortion willed as an end or 
as a means, always constitutes a grave moral 
disorder, since it is the deliberate killing of an 
innocent human being.”10
While never wavering from this position, 
magisterial teaching has also afﬁrmed an 
important nuance in the Catholic tradition, 
namely, that not all interventions that result 
in the death of the fetus qualify as abortions. 
Pius XII’s “Address to the Associations of Large 
Families” (Nov. 26, 1951) states this position 
most clearly. He provides the foundation for 
the magisterial teaching outlined above, not-
ing: “The direct attack on an innocent life, as a 
means to an end — in the present case to the 
end of saving another life — is illicit.”11 Yet he 
also goes on to explicitly clarify an important 
dimension of this position, namely, the quali-
ﬁer “direct”:
“It has been our intention here to use 
always the expressions ‘direct attempt on the 
life of the innocent person,’ ‘direct killing.’ The 
reason is that if, for example, the safety of the 
future mother, independently of her state of 
pregnancy, might call for an urgent surgical 
operation, or any other therapeutic applica-
tion, which would have as an accessory con-
sequence, in no way desired or intended, but 
inevitable, the death of the fetus, such an act 
could not be called a direct attempt on the 
innocent life. In these conditions the opera-
tions can be lawful, as can other similar medi-
cal interventions, provided that it be a matter 
of great importance, such as life, and that it is 
not possible to postpone it till the birth of the 
child, or to have recourse to any other efﬁca-
cious remedy.”12
This passage clarifies three essential 
points.13
First, “direct” is characterized as having the 
desire, intention or will to kill. Actions in which 
“This situation is altogether 
different from a dilation and 
curettage, since a dilation 
and curettage is the dismem-
bering and removing of the 
body of the child. A dilation 
and curettage or dilation 
and extraction in this cir-
cumstance is the same as an 
abortion, since it is the direct 
killing of the child.
“There is a signiﬁcant dif-
ference, morally speaking, 
between directly killing 
versus allowing a child to die 
as an unintended side effect 
of life-saving treatment. A 
similar, although not com-
pletely analogous, distinction 
is made between murder and 
self-defense. The end result 
is the same, but the action 
taken and the circumstances 
change the way we evaluate 
the end result. Once again, 
the end does not justify the 
means.
“The Catholic Position
“Today we often hear people 
say, ‘I’m against abortion 
unless in cases of rape, incest 
or situations that threaten 
the life of the mother.’ The 
Catholic position is much 
simpler; ‘we are always 
against abortion.’ Every abor-
tion is murder since it con-
stitutes the unjust killing of 
an innocent life. Thus, it can 
never be justiﬁed under any 
circumstance.
“The question might arise, 
‘Isn’t it better to save one life 
as opposed to allowing two 
people to die?’ One thing we 
must always remember is 
that no physician can predict 
what will happen with 100 
percent accuracy. We will 
never be able to eliminate 
all risks associated with 
pregnancy. What we should 
not do, however, is lower risks 
associated with pregnancy 
by aborting children. It is not 
better for a woman to have to 
live the rest of her existence 
knowing that she had her 
child killed because her preg-
nancy was high risk.
“When we try to control every 
possible situation in life, 
we end up playing the role 
of God. As people of faith 
we know that our lives are 
always in God’s hands. In 
 origins 541 
its moral object? Was it, in other words, a direct 
killing, a “deliberate or intentional” action in 
which the death of the fetus was “willed as an 
end or a means”?
2. If not, ought the intervention be prop-
erly understood as an action that had a differ-
ent moral object but also had a nondirect (not 
desired, intended or willed) accessory conse-
quence of the inevitable death of the fetus (a 
category allowed by the tradition as morally 
acceptable in certain cases)?
3. Or, is it the case that given the inevitable 
and immediate demise of the fetus (due to 
lack of viability and lack of oxygenation), it 
is not accurate to even speak of the death of 
the fetus as an accessory consequence of the 
intervention?
To address these questions requires a 
brief overview of the Thomistic notion of the 
“moral object.” I will then outline the reason-
ing and conclusions of two leading scholars 
of the Catholic moral tradition who speciﬁ-
cally address cases analogous to the one that 
occurred at St. Joseph’s.
The Moral Object
Determining the object of an act is one 
of the most critical steps in moral analysis. 
Understanding how the moral object is con-
stituted in an act, however, remains one of 
the most difﬁcult and complex components 
of Catholic moral theology. The notion of the 
moral object was articulated by St. Thomas 
Aquinas in the Summa Theologica (I-II, Q 
18-21), which formed the basis of the develop-
ment of the subsequent Catholic moral tradi-
tion.
Many leading contemporary Thomistic 
scholars hold, however, that with Thomas’ 
neo-Scholastic interpreters and much of the 
classical tradition, important nuances in the 
understanding of the moral object — and, 
indeed, of the morality of human actions 
— were lost. This resulted in methodologi-
cal problems in 20th-century Catholic moral 
theology, problems to which revisionism and 
proportionalism attempted to respond, unfor-
tunately creating a whole host of new method-
ological problems.
One of the most valuable contributions of 
Veritatis Splendor has been the renewed atten-
tion it has brought to the notion of the moral 
object. William J. Murphy Jr., associate profes-
sor of moral theology at the Pontiﬁcal College 
Josephinum in Columbus, Ohio, and editor of 
the Josephinum Journal of Theology, highlights 
six speciﬁc afﬁrmations about the moral object 
offered by John Paul II in §78. Echoing Pius XII, 
John Paul II reiterates that the moral object 
of an action is determined by the proximate 
the death of the fetus is not desired, intended 
or willed cannot “be called a direct attempt on 
the innocent life.” Second, it suggests that the 
opposite of “direct” is “nondirect” rather than 
“indirect.” The term “indirect” suggests that 
an agent could “indirectly will” an end, which 
is not descriptively accurate, per Pius. Rather, 
the agent is not willing, desiring or intending 
the “accessory consequence”; therefore, “non-
direct” (or “nonwilled”) seems more accurate. 
Third, Pius makes clear that the term “direct” 
is a description of a moral act, not a physical 
act; in other words, whether the operation/
therapeutic application causes the inevitable 
death of the fetus in a physically direct or indi-
rect manner does not enter into his argument.
“Due to the age of the fetus, there 
was no possibility that it could 
survive outside the womb. Nor, due 
to the mother’s heart failure and 
cardiogenic shock, was there any 
possibility that the fetus could sur-
vive inside the womb.”
These clariﬁcations are noteworthy because 
the classical tradition at times refers to certain 
interventions (such as those described by Pius 
XII above) as “indirect abortions.” This lan-
guage of “indirect” has carried over into the 
contemporary literature and is still, at times, 
used within the Catholic literature.
Such a description, however, is predicated 
upon a confusion of the Thomistic notion of 
the moral object of an action, has led to a mis-
application of the principle of double effect 
and suggests that there could be exceptions 
to the absolute moral norm prohibiting the 
intrinsically evil act of abortion.
Moreover, it is notable that none of the 
magisterial documents cited above — nor, as 
we shall see, the June 23, 2010, statement enti-
tled “The Distinction Between Direct Abortion 
and Legitimate Medical Procedures” issued by 
the USCCB Committee on Doctrine — use the 
phrase “indirect abortion.”
Therefore, these documents, in addition 
to the Catholic moral tradition at large, make 
clear that direct, deliberately willed abortion is 
intrinsically evil and, as such, never justiﬁable. 
The questions central to our particular case, 
therefore, are:
1. Was the procedure that occurred at St. 
Joseph’s Hospital on Nov. 5, 2009, in this case 
properly described as an “abortion,” in terms of 
these situations the reality of 
our dependence upon him 
becomes ever more clear and 
pronounced.”
Father Ehrich’s statement, 
along with many other docu-
ments, can be found on a 
website set up by the Diocese 
of Phoenix, 
www.arizonacatholic.org.
The Jan. 13, 2011, edition 
of Origins, Vol. 40, No. 31, 
includes a statement by 
Phoenix Bishop Thomas J. 
Olmsted and a document 
from St. Joseph’s Hospital and 
Medical Center. The margin 
notes section of that edition 
also includes more informa-
tion.
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end deliberately chosen by the will (in 
conformity with reason). In John Paul II’s 
words:14
“The morality of the human act 
depends primarily and fundamentally on 
the ‘object’ rationally chosen by the delib-
erate will” (emphasis in original).
“In order to be able to grasp the object 
of an act which speciﬁes that act morally, 
it is therefore necessary to place oneself 
in the perspective of the acting person” 
(emphasis in original).
“The object of the act of willing is a 
freely chosen kind of behavior.” “It is in 
conformity with the order of reason.”
“By the object of a given moral act, 
then, one cannot mean a process or an 
event of the merely physical order, to 
be assessed on the basis of its ability to 
bring about a given state of affairs in the 
outside world.”
“Rather, that object is the proximate 
end of a deliberate decision which deter-
mines the act of willing on the part of the 
acting person.”
Moreover, as Murphy notes, “in insist-
ing that this moral object must not be 
understood as ‘a process or an event of 
the merely physical order,’ John Paul’s 
primary target was revisionist theory, 
which inherited what might be called 
‘a physical understanding of the moral 
object’ from the post-Tridentine casuist 
tradition. The pope’s approach, however, 
also challenges many more traditional 
Thomists, who sometimes treat the 
object that determines the morality of 
the human act as something of the mere-
ly physical order, or as what is caused 
physically.”15
Nonetheless, the “exterior act” is not 
irrelevant — together the “interior act of 
the will” and the “exterior act” comprise 
one act. However, it is clear from Thomas 
that moral actions get their object — 
their “form” — from the interior act of 
the will.16
Murphy describes this complex bal-
ance as follows:
“A proper description of the moral 
object would not be my arm, which is a 
thing of the physical order, and not sim-
ply raising my arm, which lacks reference 
to an end — but raising my arm in order 
to greet someone; not removing Tom’s 
watch, but removing Tom’s watch to play 
a trick or removing Tom’s watch to appro-
priate it; not shooting someone, but 
shooting someone to repel his aggression 
or shooting someone to carry out capi-
tal punishment or shooting someone to 
bring about their death; not taking an 
anovulant pill, but taking an anovulant 
pill to prevent the procreative conse-
quences of the marital act or taking an 
anovulant pill to treat endometriosis.”17
A proper description of the moral 
object, then, certainly includes the “exte-
rior act” — since it is a necessary part 
of the moral action as a whole — but it 
derives its properly moral content ﬁrst 
and foremost from the proximate end 
deliberately chosen by the will. Thus, 
the object is named as greeting a friend, 
repelling aggression, capital punish-
ment, murder, contraception or healing.
It is absolutely necessary to empha-
size, then, that in the Catholic tradition, 
the moral object of an act is not equiva-
lent or reducible to its physical/material 
component. Three examples might help 
to clarify this point.
First, as mentioned by Murphy, the 
object of the action of taking an anovu-
lant pill cannot be construed only in 
terms of the physical act of taking the pill. 
The object of the act — as either “contra-
ception” or “therapy” — is determined 
by the end or intention chosen rationally 
by the deliberate will. Therefore, if the 
intention of taking such a pill is to pre-
vent conception the moral object of the 
action is contraception, which is by its 
species intrinsically evil. If the intention 
of taking the same pill, in the same man-
ner, is to treat endometriosis, the moral 
object of the action is healing, which by 
its species is good.
Second, St. Thomas himself offers 
the example of killing in self-defense. 
In doing so, he explicitly intends to dif-
ferentiate between actions which, in 
the physical order, may look exactly the 
same, but in terms of their species (good 
or evil) are radically different because of 
their different moral objects. What dif-
ferentiates actions of the object “self-
defense” (good moral object) from those 
of the object “homicide” (intrinsically 
evil moral object) is the intention or end 
of the agent, which is either to preserve 
his or her own life or to end the life of 
another.
Importantly, in this passage in the 
Summa, Thomas does not attend to the 
physical/material component of the 
action. The self-defender may have used 
a variety of agents in a variety of ways 
(e.g., hitting the assailant over the head 
with a tire iron; pushing the assailant 
over a cliff, etc.). Prima facie, an observer 
cannot immediately determine to which 
moral species this action belongs; only 
when it is understood “from the perspec-
tive of the acting person”18 and evaluated 
according to the acting person’s inten-
tion can we know the proper object and 
species.19
Third, a woman could be faced with a 
threat to her life due to pregnancy. That 
woman could, via what would look phys-
ically/externally like one and the same 
action to an external observer, pursue 
two very different moral ends and there-
fore two very different species of moral 
action, good or evil. She could deliber-
ately will to sacriﬁce her life for her child, 
based on a call to martyrdom. To do so, 
she would reject certain kinds of medi-
cal interventions. However, she might 
also have a history of depression, feel 
oppressed by the demands of raising her 
other children, perhaps have a history 
of attempting to take her own life. She 
could, via the same action above (reject-
ing certain kinds of medical interven-
tions), intend to end her own life. In so 
doing, the moral object of her act would 
be “suicide” (intrinsically evil), not mar-
tyrdom, which would make her act evil 
in species.
More examples could be offered, but I 
hope these three are sufﬁcient to demon-
strate that within Catholic moral theory, 
there is a complex interplay between the 
physical/exterior act (that which can 
be observed by a third party) and the 
actual moral act, which is comprised of 
both the interior act of the will and the 
exterior act, but whose object/species is 
determined by the formal component, 
the interior act of the will. The physical/
material action is not irrelevant to the 
determination of the object, but it is also 
not sufﬁcient.
More speciﬁcally, it is clear that within 
the Catholic tradition not all surgical or 
pharmacological interventions which 
prima facie physically directly end the 
life of a fetus fall into the species of acts 
named “abortion.” As Pius XII noted, 
the Catholic tradition holds that certain 
medical interventions aimed at healing 
a mother or saving her life that simulta-
neously cause fetal death (at the level of 
physical causality) may be justiﬁed and 
in fact are not categorized as “abortions.”
Justiﬁed via the principle of double 
effect, the three primary types of such 
interventions include:
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—Surgical removal of a fallopian tube 
containing a fetus.
—Surgical removal of a cancerous 
uterus containing a fetus.
—Administration of chemotherapy or 
other pharmaceuticals required to treat 
maternal diseases or conditions which 
may result in fetal death.
In these cases, precision of descrip-
tion and terminology is critically impor-
tant. Such cases are not referred to — 
and are not generally considered — to 
be abortions, even though in the ﬁrst two 
cases, a living fetus is surgically removed 
from the mother’s body and in the third, 
the pharmaceuticals may effectively be 
abortifacient.
Signiﬁcantly, the recent statement 
from the Committee on Doctrine dis-
cusses these interventions but does not 
refer to them as “abortions.” The object 
of the act in these cases is deemed to 
be properly described as “beneﬁtting the 
health of the mother” or, in some cases, 
as “saving the life of the mother” (if, for 
example, the fallopian tube has rup-
tured). These actions are not exceptions 
to the norm prohibiting direct abortion. 
These actions are properly described as 
a different category of action because of 
their different moral object, which is, in 
the words of Veritatis Splendor, “capable 
of being ordered to God.”20
The Moral Object of the Intervention 
at St. Joseph’s Hospital
Two leading scholars of the Catholic 
moral tradition bring the perspective of 
Veritatis Splendor and a nuanced under-
standing of the Thomistic concept of 
“moral object” to bear on cases analo-
gous to the one at St. Joseph’s. I will here 
draw on the analyses and arguments of 
Father Martin Rhonheimer and Germain 
Grisez to assess that case.21
Martin Rhonheimer
Father Martin Rhonheimer is a Catholic 
priest, incardinated in the Prelature of the 
Holy Cross and Opus Dei. He is currently 
professor of ethics and political philoso-
phy at the School of Philosophy of the 
Pontiﬁcal University of the Holy Cross in 
Rome. His writings have focused speciﬁ-
cally on the work of Thomas Aquinas as 
well as abortion and contraception.22
The following analysis relies on his 
recent work Vital Conﬂicts in Medical 
Ethics: A Virtue Approach to Craniotomy 
and Tubal Pregnancies (Catholic 
University of America Press, Washington, 
D.C., 2009).23 Here he offers analyses 
informed by the Summa Theologica and 
Veritatis Splendor with regard to extra-
uterine pregnancy, particularly tubal or 
ectopic pregnancies, and craniotomy for 
obstructed delivery. 24
He considers craniotomy not because 
it is a current procedure; contempo-
rary advances in cesarean section have 
rendered this question mostly moot. 
However, he recognizes that: (a) crani-
otomy was a key case of debate for 19th- 
and early 20th-century moral theolo-
gians and magisterial authors; (b) schol-
ars on both sides of the debate relied 
on problematic methodologies that 
misconstrued Thomas; and (c) the ques-
tion embodies key elements that con-
tinue to trouble contemporary debates 
over potentially analogous interventions 
(i.e., craniotomy, by deﬁnition, consists 
in a physically direct intervention on the 
fetus and therefore looks, from an exter-
nal observer perspective, like an appar-
ent morally direct attack on a child to 
save the life of a mother).
Rhonheimer also focuses on these 
two cases because in these cases medi-
cal personnel are faced with a situation 
in which it is certain that without medi-
cal intervention, both mother and child 
will die.
Rhonheimer agrees that direct abor-
tion is intrinsically evil and can never be 
justiﬁed. He speciﬁcally rejects any moral 
methodology (i.e., proportionalism) that 
involves the “weighing of goods”: “It is 
morally impermissible,” he notes, “to 
weigh two lives against each other and 
to make a preferential choice.”25 Such a 
method, he argues, entertains the pos-
sibility of choosing against the life of the 
child, a possibility that is never permitted 
in the Catholic moral tradition.
While many cases of obstetric conﬂict 
do present such a possibility — the pos-
sibility of choosing against the life of the 
mother or the life of the child — in cer-
tain instances the child’s chance of sur-
vival is negligibly small or, in fact, non-
existent. These cases, he argues, have a 
distinguishing, morally relevant feature, 
namely, that:
“Only the life of the mother is at the 
disposal of another human being — the 
fetus is no longer even subject to a deci-
sion between ‘killing or allowing to live’; 
the only morally good thing that can 
be chosen here is to save the life of the 
mother.”26
With respect to the life or death of the 
embryo, the question “to kill or let live” 
can no longer be decided about or cho-
sen. The only practical and moral ques-
tion that remains regards the mother: “To 
let die or save?” He also states clearly that 
“the decision to allow both mother and 
child to die — at least when the mother 
can be saved and the child will die in any 
case — is simply irrational”; this is not an 
ad hominem comment but rather a very 
speciﬁc Thomistic critique, based on the 
critical role of reason in moral discern-
ment and action.27
While the justiﬁcation for the classic 
cases of maternal-fetal conﬂict in the 
tradition (cancerous uterus, etc.) have 
relied on the principle of double effect, 
Rhonheimer argues that in cases where 
there is no chance for the child to sur-
vive, the principle of double effect is not 
applicable because there are not in fact 
two effects.
Given that no action can save the life 
of the child, its death effectively falls out-
side the scope of the moral description of 
the action. Moreover, since there are not 
two effects, one cannot argue that the 
death of the child is a means to the end 
of saving the life of the mother:
“In this case [of ectopic pregnancy 
or craniotomy], the killing of the fetus 
would not consist in a choice of the death 
of a human being as a means to save the 
life of the mother. … Only if the fetus 
would otherwise survive could its death 
be said to be chosen as a means — and 
thus caused ‘directly’ in a morally rel-
evant way. But in our case, the death of 
the fetus is not willed in order to save 
the mother; as far as the life of the fetus 
is concerned, it is beyond any kind of 
willing.”28
Here Rhonheimer follows St. Thomas 
in his account of the moral object of the 
act. He notes, as discussed above, that for 
many analysts the “physical directness” 
of the act seems highly signiﬁcant, but he 
argues that it is not morally determina-
tive. He maintains that the object of the 
act in these cases is properly described as 
“the saving of the mother’s life”:
“The killing of the fetus [in salpin-
gectomy or craniotomy] falls here under 
the pure and simple genus naturae of 
the moral (intentional) act of ‘saving 
the mother’s life.’ (Stated in Thomistic 
terms: The fatal medical intervention by 
which the fetus or embryo is removed is 
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the material part of the act, whereas the 
basic intention or the ﬁnis proximus of 
the life-saving act is the formal part of the 
moral object of the act).”29
In these cases, where the fetus is 
not dying at the time of the interven-
tion but will not be able to survive due 
to the imperiled state of the mother, 
Rhonheimer argues that the death of the 
fetus is “to be considered a purely physi-
cal evil caused praeter intentionem [out-
side of the moral intention].”30 
This is shown, he argues, “by the fact 
that one would not feel justiﬁed in per-
forming the intervention if the child had 
a real chance of survival. But in our case, 
it is not only that the death of the embryo 
is regretted ... but that it is decided to 
perform the operation solely because it 
is known — and regretted for this reason 
— that the child will not survive. This is a 
signiﬁcant difference.”31
He bases this analysis on Aquinas’ 
example of self-defense. Rejecting the 
argument that obstetrical cases ought 
to be understood under the rubric of 
self-defense, he demonstrates that for 
Aquinas, the object of the act of legiti-
mate self-defense is “good” — even if it 
involves a physically direct act of killing 
— because the act of self-defense, on 
the basis of its moral object, is an act of 
“self-preservation,” which is a good. In 
Rhonheimer’s words:
“What is effectively done here [in 
Thomas’ case of self-defense] is nothing 
other than an act of killing; but the inten-
tio is the preservation of one’s life and, 
because the act of killing occurs praeter 
intentionem, the object of the action is 
determined formally by the intention of 
self-preservation. ... The parallel [to the 
obstetrical case] consists only in this: 
that an act can be an act of killing mate-
rialiter but something else entirely for-
maliter, e.g., self-preservation, the saving 
of a life, medical therapy. The object of an 
action is determined on the basis of the 
formal aspect, not the material.”32
Consequently, he argues, certainly 
interventions on extrauterine pregnancy 
but also craniotomy are not properly 
understood, per their object, as “abor-
tion”:
“With respect to the moral object of 
the action, this intervention has nothing 
to do with an abortion; it is rather a ther-
apeutic measure in favor of the woman, 
with the only intentional content of the 
action being the healing and the saving 
of the mother’s life.”33
Rhonheimer’s analysis is directly 
applicable to the case at St. Joseph’s inso-
far as: (a) it is a case where both mother 
and child are in immediate danger of 
dying and (b) there is no chance that the 
child can be saved. Even more clearly 
than in cases of extrauterine gravidity 
or the cancerous uterus, the child at St. 
Joseph’s had already begun to die and his 
or her death was, at the point of interven-
tion, inevitable.
“A pathology threatened the 
lives of both the pregnant 
woman and her child, it was 
not safe to wait or waiting 
surely would have resulted in 
the death of both, there was 
no way to save the child and 
an operation that could save 
the mother’s life would, at 
least prima facie, result in the 
child’s death.”
Therefore, Rhonheimer would claim 
that (a) one cannot properly in that 
case speak of the intervention as hav-
ing two effects; and (b) that even if one 
could establish that the “matter” of the 
action of the dilation and curettage was 
or appeared to be a physically direct act 
of killing, morally, the death of the child 
would have been praeter intentionem, 
outside the scope of the intention and 
therefore outside of the proper moral 
description of the action.
He holds the latter position both on 
formal grounds (the intention of the 
intervention was not to kill the child 
but to save the mother) and on mate-
rial grounds (that the child’s death was 
inevitable and so therefore could not be 
chosen).
Consequently, Rhonheimer would 
likely argue that the object of the act of 
intervention at St. Joseph’s was “saving 
the life of the mother” or “legitimate 
medical therapy,” not “abortion.”34 He 
would also argue that there was no other 
reasonable (in the Thomistic sense) or 
morally good course of action that could 
have been chosen or pursued.
Germain Grisez
Germain Grisez is a Catholic moral theo-
logian and author of the magnum opus 
three-volume treatment of Christian 
morality entitled The Way of the Lord 
Jesus (1983). Grisez spent his career 
articulating a new form of natural law 
thinking, deeply grounded in the work 
of Thomas Aquinas and his interpreters, 
and his work is thoroughly consonant 
with the teachings of the magisterium. 
In addition to works on natural law, he 
has consistently written on questions of 
contraception and abortion. He is cur-
rently emeritus professor of Christian 
ethics at Mount St. Mary’s University in 
Emmitsburg, Md.
In Volume 2 of The Way of the Lord 
Jesus, subtitled Living a Christian Life, 
Grisez takes up the question, “Is abortion 
always the wrongful killing of a person?”35 
As with Rhonheimer, Grisez’s argument 
again centers on the concept of the 
moral object with speciﬁc attention to 
intention. As he notes, “Intentional kill-
ing is synonymous with another expres-
sion sometimes found in the church’s 
teaching: direct killing,”36 but yet “one 
can knowingly cause something without 
intending it.”37
In other words, Grisez argues, follow-
ing Pius XII, one can knowingly cause 
a death without it being a direct killing. 
By this logic, not all intentional abor-
tion involves intentional killing; in other 
words, “someone might choose to abort 
without choosing to kill.”38
Grisez posits two scenarios where one 
might choose to abort without choosing 
to kill, those situations in which:
“A woman suffering from kidney 
disease becomes pregnant and wants 
to avoid the health problems that will 
result from carrying the child, or a 
woman becomes pregnant as a result of 
rape and wants to be freed of her ongo-
ing suffering. In either case, and perhaps 
in a few others, in seeking abortion the 
precise object of the pregnant woman’s 
choice might be, not the baby’s death or 
any consequence of it. On this assump-
tion, the proposal adopted is, not to kill 
the unborn baby, but to have him or her 
removed from the womb, with death 
as a foreseen and accepted side effect. 
An abortion carrying out such a choice 
would not be an intentional killing.”39
He continues on to argue that even 
though these cases would count as “abor-
tion” but would not count as intentional 
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killing, it would still be wrong to abort the 
child or accept the baby’s death.40 Simply 
because it is not an intentional killing, for 
Grisez, does not make it justiﬁable.
The only circumstance in which 
Grisez holds that it would be licit to 
accept the baby’s death would be to save 
the mother’s life, and then only when 
certain conditions are met.41 He argues 
as follows:
“Sometimes the baby’s death may be 
accepted to save the mother. Sometimes 
four conditions are simultaneously ful-
ﬁlled: (i) some pathology threatens the 
lives of both a pregnant woman and her 
child, (ii) it is not safe to wait or waiting 
will surely result in the death of both, (iii) 
there is no way to save the child, and (iv) 
an operation that can save the mother’s 
life will result in the child’s death.
“If the operation was one of those 
which the classical moralists considered 
not to be a ‘direct’ abortion, they held 
that it could be performed. For example, 
in cases in which the baby could not 
be saved regardless of what was done 
(and perhaps in some others as well), 
they accepted the removal of a cancerous 
gravid uterus or of a fallopian tube con-
taining an ectopic pregnancy. This moral 
norm plainly is sound, since the opera-
tion does not carry out a proposal to kill 
the child, serves a good purpose and vio-
lates neither fairness nor mercy.”42
He recognizes that some moral-
ists, both classical and contemporary, 
would classify certain other procedures 
as “‘direct killing,’ since the procedure 
in question would lead to the baby’s 
death.”43 Like Rhonheimer, he cites the 
question of craniotomy for obstructed 
delivery. He wishes to challenge this 
position and does so as follows:
“However, assuming the four condi-
tions are met, the baby’s death need not 
be included in the proposal adopted in 
choosing to do a craniotomy. The pro-
posal can be simply to alter the child’s 
physical dimensions and remove him or 
her because, as a physical object, this 
body cannot remain where it is without 
ending in both the baby’s and the moth-
er’s deaths. To understand this proposal, 
it helps to notice that the baby’s death 
contributes nothing to the objective 
sought; indeed, the procedure is exactly 
the same if the baby has already died.
“In adopting this proposal, the baby’s 
death need only be accepted as a side 
effect. Therefore … even craniotomy 
(and, a fortiori, other operations meeting 
the four stated conditions) need not be 
direct killing, and so, provided the death 
of the baby is not intended (which is pos-
sible but unnecessary), any operation in 
a situation meeting the four conditions 
could be morally acceptable.”44
“The purpose of a dila-
tion and curettage in and of 
itself is not, as the National 
Catholic Bioethics Center 
states repeatedly, ‘the dis-
memberment of a fetus.’”
In the subsequent section, he makes 
clear that “sometimes the baby’s life 
should be given priority”45 and that “if 
the mother’s life is not at stake, it is unfair 
to accept the baby’s death.”46 But he also 
emphasizes that “in a situation in which 
the lives of both a pregnant woman and 
her child are at stake and both cannot be 
saved, if an operation can be performed 
with a prospect of saving one or the 
other, fairness can require the procedure 
more likely to save at least one.”47
Again, the application to the case at 
St. Joseph’s Hospital is clear. The case 
clearly meets Grisez’s four criteria: (i) a 
pathology threatened the lives of both 
the pregnant woman and her child, (ii) 
it was not safe to wait or waiting surely 
would have resulted in the death of both, 
(iii) there was no way to save the child, 
and (iv) an operation that could save the 
mother’s life would, at least prima facie, 
result in the child’s death.
Grisez would therefore likely hold that 
the intervention enacted at St. Joseph’s 
ought not be categorized as a direct kill-
ing, for the baby’s death was not what 
was intended.
As mentioned earlier, Rhonheimer 
explicitly argues that in such cases, the 
moral object is not “abortion” properly 
speaking but rather “saving the life of the 
mother.” Grisez includes the foregoing 
discussion under a general heading “Ch. 
8, Question D: Is Abortion Always the 
Wrongful Killing of a Person?,” suggest-
ing that even these interventions ought 
to be named “abortion” but ought also to 
be considered “indirect” since the death 
of the child is outside of the intention of 
the agent/act.
Importantly, however, in the section 
where Grisez outlines the above argu-
ment, he does not use the term “abor-
tion.” In the preceding sections, he clear-
ly uses the term (Ch. 8, D3b: “Sometimes 
intentional abortion does not involve 
intentional killing”; Ch. 8, D3c: “Abortion, 
even if not intentional killing, usually is 
wrong”).
Yet when he moves to discuss cases 
meeting these four criteria, the word 
“abortion” disappears: the heading for 
the section is “Ch. 8, D3d: Sometimes the 
baby’s death may be accepted to save the 
mother”; and the word “abortion” only 
appears once in this discussion, and not 
in relation to interventions which result 
in or accept the death of the child.
It appears that Grisez wants to sug-
gest that not only are cases meeting these 
four criteria properly identiﬁed as “indi-
rect,” but that their object is not “abor-
tion” but rather “saving the mother’s life.”
Analogies to Cases
Therefore, should any ethics committee 
at a Catholic hospital research the litera-
ture on this question, they would obtain 
a consensus opinion from two leading 
conservative scholars of the Catholic 
moral tradition, both of whom have writ-
ten in defense of Humanae Vitae, who 
are expert scholars of Thomas Aquinas, 
are dedicated to Veritatis Splendor and 
Evangelium Vitae, and who have made 
clear their dedication to magisterial 
teaching.48
That opinion would have supported 
the conclusion reached by the ethics 
committee at St. Joseph’s Hospital and 
Medical Center.
The ethics committee’s delibera-
tions were also no doubt inﬂuenced by 
the general knowledge within Catholic 
health care of the obstetrical cases men-
tioned above that are understood to 
be justiﬁed according to Directive 48. 
Reasoning analogously from these cases 
would lead the committee to:
a. Attempt to rely on the principle of 
double effect, although both Rhonheimer 
and Grisez suggest that in these particu-
lar cases, there are no longer two effects.
b. Reason that in the cases of a can-
cerous uterus, ectopic pregnancy or che-
motherapy, the intervention does in fact 
physically directly kill the child although 
it is understood to be “indirect” on the 
moral level; therefore, the committee 
would likely have viewed the interven-
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tion proposed in this case (dilation and 
curettage to detach the placenta) to be 
analogous, and perhaps less grave, given 
that here the child was already in the 
process of dying.
c. Understand that given the terminal 
condition of the baby, the moral object of 
the intervention was properly described 
as “saving the life of the mother.”
Evaluation of Analyses and Statements
As part of this analysis, an evaluation 
of the opinion offered by the National 
Catholic Bioethics Center was requested. 
A comment on the applicability of the 
statement by the Committee on Doctrine 
of the USCCB was also requested. These 
follow below.
The National Catholic Bioethics Center 
Analysis — June 11, 2010
The National Catholic Bioethics Center 
offers a number of objections to the 
intervention at St. Joseph’s Hospital. 
First, they claim: “The pregnancy was 
seen as a pathology. However, there was 
no evidence of any pathology of the 
reproductive organs, nor of the fetus, its 
placenta or its membranes.”
Here the National Catholic Bioethics 
Center draws too stark a distinction 
between particular organs and the entire 
physiological system of which they are a 
part. I do not mean here to invoke the 
principle of totality; rather, this is simply 
a biological fact. While some pathologies 
can be localized to a particular organ or 
site, most pathologies, particularly those 
that are life-threatening, cannot be 
restricted in this manner.
Pulmonary hypertension is, on one 
level, “located” in the lungs; but inso-
far as the lungs are critical for the oxy-
genation of the blood, which is critically 
important for the entire physiologi-
cal organism, and insofar as immedi-
ate effects of this pathology are cardiac 
impairment, and so forth, it is difﬁcult to 
accept an argument which attempts to 
simply localize pathology.
As noted in Part I above, it can be 
legitimately, medically argued that the 
pregnancy resulted in physiological 
changes that exacerbated an underlying 
pathology, resulting in two new critical 
pathologies (right heart failure and car-
diogenic shock), all of which created a 
pathological and ultimately fatal context 
for the fetus.
Second, the National Catholic 
Bioethics Center rejects Catholic 
Healthcare West’s use of the phrase “ter-
mination of pregnancy” and suggests, 
without charity, that it is best understood 
as “misleading terminology which hides 
the truth.” Precision in terminology is, 
however, critical to the work of moral 
analysis, as the foregoing account has 
demonstrated.
“The material intervention 
here was equally or potential-
ly less of a direct attack on the 
child than other obstetrical 
interventions justiﬁed within 
the Catholic tradition.”
Given the clinical facts of the situa-
tion, the phrase “termination of preg-
nancy” is an accurate medical descrip-
tion of what the intervention was trying 
to achieve (to terminate the burden of 
the pregnancy, not to kill the child); “save 
the life of the mother” is an accurate 
moral description of the intervention.
Third, while I agree with Rhonheimer 
that this case does not fall under the 
principle of double effect, I believe the 
National Catholic Bioethics Center anal-
ysis of the principle of double effect in 
this case is inadequate on a number of 
counts:
1. The ﬁrst criterion for the principle 
of double effect requires that the action 
be good or morally neutral in and of 
itself. The National Catholic Bioethics 
Center response to this criterion begs 
the question. “Action” here has tradition-
ally been understood as the most basic 
description of the action itself. For exam-
ple, when the principle of double effect is 
used to justify the use of narcotic agents 
that might hasten death, the response to 
the ﬁrst criterion is usually framed as fol-
lows: “The use of narcotics to treat pain 
is a morally acceptable and even good 
medical action.”
Following this model, one would 
begin an analysis of the intervention at 
St. Joseph’s using the principle of double 
effect by noting that the procedure of 
dilation and curettage is, in and of itself, 
a morally neutral and most often a good 
medical intervention. A dilation and 
curettage is used in a variety of gyneco-
logical situations as a legitimate therapy.
It is most commonly used to treat 
disorders resulting in abnormal bleed-
ing, polyps and incomplete miscarriages, 
and management of placental issues. It is 
only rarely used as a method of abortion 
(2.4 percent of the cases of abortion in 
the U.S.49). Therefore, the purpose of a 
dilation and curettage in and of itself is 
not, as the National Catholic Bioethics 
Center states repeatedly, “the dismem-
berment of a fetus.”
Furthermore, as Rhonheimer notes: 
“One could add ... that neither is the prin-
ciple of double effect suited to determin-
ing the ‘species’ of an action according 
to its object. Indeed, every application of 
the principle of double effect presuppos-
es (in accordance with the ﬁrst condition 
...) that the act performed is already seen 
as good or at least indifferent according 
to its object. But the controversial and 
most delicate cases are precisely those 
in which it is not clear what the object 
of the chosen and performed act actu-
ally is.”50
2. Similarly, regarding the second cri-
terion, the National Catholic Bioethics 
Center seems unduly focused on the 
notion of the “dismemberment of the 
fetus.” To claim that what was “intended 
in the procedure was the dismember-
ing of the fetus in order to remove it” 
can only be made by disregarding all that 
Catholic Healthcare West has said about 
this case.
This also stands in direct contradic-
tion to John Paul II’s clear position that 
“in order to be able to grasp the object of 
an act which speciﬁes that act morally, 
it is therefore necessary to place oneself 
in the perspective of the acting person.”51
As demonstrated with Rhonheimer 
above, the formal intention of the act-
ing person (or in this case persons), not 
the material action, deﬁnes the moral 
object. On no basis can it be argued that 
what was intended in this case was the 
dismemberment of the fetus insofar as:
a. The mother and medical staff had, 
to this point, done all in their power to 
promote the life of the child.
b. Ending the life of the child per se 
would have no effect on the medical 
condition of the mother. Therefore, the 
death of the child could not be intended 
as a means to the end of saving the life of 
the mother. An act cannot be intended 
as a means to an end if it will not accom-
plish that end. The intentional object of 
the procedure centered on the placenta, 
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which was medically and physiologically 
the cause of the crisis.
c. The “attack” on the placenta does 
not differ, from the perspective of the 
fetus, from the “attack” on the cancer-
ous uterus — in both cases, the organ is 
a maternal/fetal organ upon which the 
fetus is vitally dependent.
d. In the current situation, however, 
because of the mother’s loss of heart 
function, the placenta was no longer ful-
ﬁlling its life-sustaining function vis à vis 
the child but was imperiling the life of 
both the mother and the child.
e. The National Catholic Bioethics 
Center claims that in discussions with 
physicians, no physicians believe it is 
practically possible to perform a dilation 
and curettage without dismemberment. 
However, this fact is clinically disputed.
f. Catholic Healthcare West states 
clearly that the physicians took every 
effort to avoid harming the child, though 
it is, of course, difﬁcult to do so. A simi-
lar risk to the fetus holds, however, in 
cases of extracting a cancerous uterus 
or removing an ectopic pregnancy. In 
the case of the chemotherapeutic agents 
ingested by a cancer-ridden mother, the 
chemotherapy poisons the child. The 
material intervention here was equally 
or potentially less of a direct attack on 
the child than other obstetrical interven-
tions justiﬁed within the Catholic tradi-
tion.
3. The fetal death was in no way the 
cause of or necessary to bringing about 
the good effect (the alleviation of the car-
diac overload). Fetal dying had already 
initiated with the medical crisis of the 
mother, and the medical crisis of the 
mother would have continued to exacer-
bate even if the fetus had died before the 
mother underwent any external inter-
vention. This was established in Part I 
above.
Fetal demise happens frequently with 
no effect on pregnancy; in this instance, 
it was the pregnancy that was imperil-
ing the mother, a pregnancy that could 
no longer sustain the fetus. It was not 
the child that was imperiling the mother. 
The death of the child, therefore, could 
not medically be the means toward the 
good end of saving the mother’s life.
As mentioned above, the National 
Catholic Bioethics Center analysis focus-
es quite intently on the image of the dis-
memberment of the fetus. In light of John 
Paul II and Rhonheimer, I would argue 
that in doing so they reduce the object of 
the act to the physical action of the dila-
tion and curettage and in doing so fail to 
offer an accurate, Thomistic account of 
the moral object of the action in keeping 
with the Catholic moral tradition.
Statement of the USCCB Committee on 
Doctrine — June 23, 2010
The Committee on Doctrine also offered a 
brief clariﬁcation on some questions that 
can arise in obstetrical situations in their 
June 23, 2010, statement entitled “The 
Distinction Between Direct Abortion and 
Legitimate Medical Procedures.”
“The Committee on Doctrine 
statement does not address 
the situation faced by St. 
Joseph’s Hospital where two 
lives were in peril and it was 
clear that the child was in the 
process of dying and would 
die shortly.”
They offer two scenarios. The ﬁrst 
scenario they offer is the case of a direct 
abortion, one in which “a pregnant 
woman is experiencing problems with 
one or more of her organs, apparently as 
a result of the added burden of pregnan-
cy,” and a surgical intervention “directly 
targets the life of the unborn child. ... 
The surgery does not directly address 
the health problem of the woman, for 
example, by repairing the organ that is 
malfunctioning. The surgery is likely to 
improve the functioning of the organ or 
organs, but only in an indirect way, i.e., 
by lessening the overall demands placed 
upon the organ or organs, since the 
burden posed by the pregnancy will be 
removed. The abortion is the means by 
which a reduced strain upon the organ 
or organs is achieved.”52
The second scenario they offer is 
that of the cancerous uterus discussed 
above and they correctly note that such 
procedures “indirectly and unintention-
ally (although foreseeably) result[s] in the 
death of the unborn child. In this case 
the surgery directly addresses the health 
problem of the woman. ... The woman’s 
health beneﬁts directly from the surgery. 
The surgery does not directly target the 
life of the unborn child. The death of the 
child is an unintended and unavoidable 
side effect and not the aim of the sur-
gery.”53
The Committee on Doctrine does 
not draw any conclusions about the St. 
Joseph case in this brief. However, per 
the foregoing analysis, John Paul II, 
Rhonheimer and even Grisez would like-
ly argue that their analysis conﬂates the 
notion of direct/indirect with medical/
physical directness. As we have seen, the 
notion of direct/indirect applies to the 
will and intention of the agent vis à vis 
the moral object of the act as a whole, not 
to the directness of the medical interven-
tion vis à vis either a pathological organ 
or the fetus.
The Committee on Doctrine state-
ment does not address the situation 
faced by St. Joseph’s Hospital where two 
lives were in peril and it was clear that 
the child was in the process of dying and 
would die shortly. As we have seen, in 
that situation, an intervention cannot 
effectively directly or indirectly result in 
the death of the child.
Had the mother followed her physi-
cian’s advice at 7 1/2 weeks, then clearly, 
the mother would have found herself in 
the committee’s ﬁrst scenario, undergo-
ing a direct abortion. As we have noted, 
however, she steadfastly refused to have 
a direct abortion because of her Catholic 
faith.
It is my understanding that St. Joseph’s 
Hospital understood its intervention to 
most closely resemble the second scenar-
io offered by the Committee on Doctrine. 
I would suggest that it is notable, per our 
discussion of Rhonheimer above, that the 
committee does not use the term “abor-
tion” in that scenario and instead refers 
to it under the auspice of a different (and 
accurate) object: “legitimate medical 
intervention.” Following the Committee 
on Doctrine, St. Joseph’s Hospital would 
be justiﬁed in understanding the inter-
vention they authorized as a “legitimate 
medical intervention.”
Summary
In summation, the ethics committee at 
St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center, 
fully aware of the magisterial teaching 
on direct abortion, was faced with a 
scenario in which they needed to dis-
cern whether the proposed intervention 
would: (a) properly be described as an 
abortion in the moral sense; or (b) if it 
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rather entailed a different moral object.
Given the medical facts of the case, it 
was germane to their deliberation that in 
this instance it was not a matter of weigh-
ing one life against another or choosing 
one life over another; they were faced 
with a scenario in which without action 
both mother and child would die and 
that regardless of the course of action, 
the child was now terminal.
Their decision to proceed with the 
dilation and curettage to relieve the 
pressure placed by the placenta on the 
mother’s cardiovascular system in order 
to address the immediate pathologies of 
right-side heart failure and cardiogenic 
shock and thereby save the mother’s life 
would ﬁnd full support from the care-
ful, rigorous arguments provided by two 
of the Catholic moral tradition’s leading 
ﬁgures, Father Martin Rhonheimer and 
Germain Grisez.
Analysis of the works of both of these 
authors also suggests that the action 
taken at St. Joseph’s is fully in keeping 
with the position of Veritatis Splendor.
Following the opinions of these 
authors, I would argue that the inter-
vention that occurred at St. Joseph’s 
Hospital on Nov. 5, 2009, cannot properly 
be described as an “abortion,” in terms 
of its moral object. At most, the effect 
on the child can only be categorized as 
“indirect,” which is morally permitted by 
the Catholic tradition.
Most important, the death of the child 
was not willed, either by the mother or 
the medical staff; the child was a deeply 
wanted child. Effecting the death of the 
child would not achieve any medical or 
ancillary end. Therefore the death of the 
child was not the means to any end in 
this case.
It is difﬁcult to see how any Catholic 
hospital or member of their staff could 
have reached a conclusion different from 
the one taken by St. Joseph’s Hospital 
given: (a) the opinions of two highly 
reputable conservative scholars in the 
Catholic moral tradition; (b) the medi-
cal facts of the case; (c) the hospital’s 
familiarity with justiﬁed cases of indirect 
fetal termination in the literature; and 
(d) their familiarity with the principle of 
double effect.
It is my opinion that the intervention 
performed at St. Joseph’s Hospital and 
Medical Center on Nov. 5, 2009, cannot 
properly be described as an abortion. 
The moral object of the intervention was 
to save the life of the mother. The death 
of the fetus was, at maximum, nondirect 
and praeter intentionem.
More likely, the fetus was already 
dying due to the pathological situation 
prior to the intervention; as such, it is 
inaccurate to understand the death of 
the fetus as an accessory consequence to 
the intervention.
I conclude that St. Joseph’s Hospital 
and Medical Center acted in accord with 
the Ethical and Religious Directives, 
Catholic moral tradition and univer-
sally valid moral precepts in working to 
respect the sanctity and dignity of life, 
ﬁrst doing what they could to foster the 
lives of both the mother and the child 
and then, when it was clear the child had 
begun the dying process, to do what they 
could to save the mother.
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